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SIMPLIFICATION AND REFORM*
By ROBERT COUZIN**

I. INTRODUCTION
Efficiency of collection, stability of revenues, and simplicity
in compliance and administration at an acceptable level lie at the
very origin of taxation. Rulers found that the restraint and discipline
required to substitute such regular exactions for irregular plunder
was worth the effort. In the long run, it paid to preserve the goose.
Tax systems have been modified and improved in many ways through
the ages, but they have not become any simpler.
The increasing complexity of taxation should be viewed in the
context of increasingly complex social and business organization, the
emergence of the market-driven economy, and the further interaction
of such market forces with state command or influence. Also
relevant are our contemporary conceptions of equity, derived from
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political theories that ground
our conception of the nation-state. All these facts have undoubtedly
shaped the tax system.
A central event in this context is the choice of income as a
major tax base. That selection reflects several of the modern
objectives of taxation and, indeed, of the state. Equally important
has been the rising cost (albeit in a world of rising product) of both
Such revenue
warfare and welfare, basic ends of taxation.
requirements substantially widened the scope of income taxation.
Only one-seventh of the British work force paid income tax in 1914,
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while today subjection to income tax and the political franchise are
nearly coextensive.
The confluence of all these trends has
engendered an overwhelming complexity.
The development of income taxation in this century is a
striking indictment of the representative process of lawmaking. I am
reminded of the diner who complains after a meal in which the
vegetables were over-cooked, the meat of poor quality, the bread
stale, and the wine past its prime. The diner's companion agrees
and adds: "and such small portions." Amendments and revisions to
the tax system have often been tardy, ill-conceived, inappropriate,
and ineffective. Alas, unlike the poor food, the portions have been
all too generous.
Since the Second World War, we have witnessed the income
tax systems in several Western countries collapsing under their own
weight of complexity. Cycles of action and reaction have been
recognized not only as bad policy, but as bad politics. Tax reform,
by no means a new idea, acquired a new rhetoric. Part of that
rhetoric is simplification.
Many who look back with nostalgia to the simplicity of the
pre-1972 Income Tax Act may wonder that simplification was a goal
in 1962. Yet, the Order in Council establishing the Carter
Commission included a requirement that the Commissioners consider
and report on "the changes that may be made to achieve greater
clarity, simplicity
and effectiveness in the tax laws and their
1
administration."
In this paper, I seek to clarify the relationship between
simplification and reform, with particular reference to the Carter
Commission and the fate of its proposals. It is my thesis that tax
reform is a juncture at which simplification can be advanced. It
need not be a source of additional complexity. The Commission
seems to have perceived the relationship in this way. However, the
actual reforms of 1971, and especially the continuing tax reform of
the 1970s and 1980s, certainly belie my proposition.
After considering the general relationship between
simplification and reform, I will touch upon an example where

!Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966)
(Chair K.LeM. Carter) at vi [hereinafter Report].
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reform has complicated what it could have simplified: the taxation
of capital gains. I will then explore the relationship in different
dimensions, looking not to examples, but rather to interactions
between simplicity and other goals of the system. In one direction,
I will follow the road to equity, and in another the heavily travelled
path of tax avoidance.
II. INTERFERENCE OF SIMPLIFICATION AND REFORM
Complexity is often viewed as the inevitable by-product of
reform. On this view, other tax policy goals, particularly equity,
leave no room for simplicity. On the contrary, I suggest that
convoluted drafting: fuzzy, illogical, and inconsistent concepts and
poor administrative organization cause (or, more precisely,
constitute) complexity. These can and should be mitigated, not
aggravated, by reform.
I have elsewhere dared to espouse some views regarding the
process of simplification. 2 I put forward as a working definition that
"a tax measure may generally be said to enhance tax simplification
it if facilitates compliance." Tax simplification is too often equated
with improvements in statutory drafting, and the simplification of
language is undoubtedly an important part of the process. The goal
in this arena is measured by clarity, not certainty or even brevity.
More important than correction of drafting is, however, simplification
of the tax system's underlying concepts. The statute is improved
internally by greater logical consistency among its various elements.
Externally, simplification requires increasing correlation between
statutory notions and the reality of activities, transactions, and
institutions to which the Act applies. Finally, I echoed the recent
focus upon a third element: administration.
Obviously, the
administration of the tax system depends to a great extent upon both
the statutory language being applied and the underlying concepts.
In addition, however, the administrative application of the statute
itself is in need of simplification through greater uniformity,

2R.Couzin, 'The Process of Simplification" (1983) 32 Can. Tax 3. 487.

436

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26 No. 3

heightened efficiency, and the dissemination of accurate and timely
information.
My attempt to link simplification with compliance is not mere
intellectual musing. The Canadian income tax system is built upon
self-assessment and voluntary compliance. Such voluntarism is
worthy from a socio-political point of view. It is also critical to the
efficiency of the system, measured by the accuracy of the assessment
and the cost of collection. Thus, facilitating administration and
compliance (both of which I subsume in the former) is an official,
as well as an academic, sense of simplification 3
The process of "reform", as its name implies, entails a
restructuring, reordering, or reaction of the tax system. We usually
associate the need for reform with imperfection or corruption. The
Christian church required "reformation" in the sixteenth century
because, the reformers claimed, it had taken the wrong path and
transgressed its own first principles. Reform is thus associated, not
merely with change, but with betterment. Tax reform attracts all of
these connotations, and strongly emphasizes a "fresh start."
The goals of tax reform have been variously stated. Often
there is concern expressed whether these goals are consistent with
any tax simplification at all. In my earlier effort, I concluded that
tax simplification is one policy goal among others, and merits some
weight when the inevitable trade-offs occur. Clearly, it has not had
a fair shake to date. This same view was expressed by the
government in the 1984 small-business simplification proposals
A metaphor for the interference between simplification and
other tax reform goals is the physics of two independent wave
sources. Pebbles dropped in a pond create an interference pattern.
There are nodes, where wave crests from one source cross troughs
from the other, cancelling out and leaving nothing. There are also
double crests, points where the two interfering waves reinforce one
another. So it is that conflicting tax policies may form nodes; both

3

Hon. M.A. Wilson, Minister of Finance, Guidelinesfor Tax Reform in Canada (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 1986) at 3; Canada, Department of Finance, Simplifying Taxes for
Small Business (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1984) at 1.
4

Simplifying Taxes for Small Business, ibid
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cannot survive.
There are also double crests, points where
simplification and other objectives may coincide.
The Carter Commission perceived simplification in this way:
not as an impediment to or an inevitable casualty of tax reform,
but as an integral part of it. There can be no clearer statement of
the double crest formed by competing tax policy goals than this:
"a policy is inefficient if an objective could have been more
adequately realized without at the same time having to sacrifice the
realization of another objective. 's While recognizing that there are
policy conflicts, the Commissioners also noted that inefficiency arises
where the trade-offs are misunderstood and "it is erroneously
believed that in pursuing one objective it will necessarily mean
another will be less adequately realized." This theory extends to
simplification, as to other goals. One could cite, as an example, the
Commissioners' proposals regarding the taxation of capital gains,
which were expressly
designed to provide incremental simplification
6
and greater equity.
Tax reform in the 1980s has elevated simplification to top
billing. While the Carter Commission considered it a worthwhile
exercise, and part and parcel of the tax reform process, recent
polemic expressly extols the virtues of simplification as a forgotten
but no less worthwhile objective. Thus, in the United States, the
President's proposals that preceded the 1986 tax reform were
entitled "Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and
Simplicity." Interestingly, the report cites complexity as a policy
anathema, not merely because it renders compliance more difficult
and revenue collection less efficient, but also because of its positive
correlation with another tax evil: inequity, and the perception of
inequity.7 In Canada, the same message appeared in the 1985
budget paper on corporate tax reform.8 Here, the goals of the
SReport, vol. 2, supra, note 1 at 23.

61bid. vol. 1 at 15.
7

The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity

(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985) at 1-2.
8

Hon. M.A. Wilson, Minister of Finance, The CorporateIncome Tax System: A Direction

for Change (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1985).
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reform were stated to be market efficiency (read: minimum of
interference), certainty (not predictability but stability), simplicity
(ease of compliance), and stability of tax revenues.
The theme continued in the government's October 1986 tax
reform paper.9 We need, the Minister said, a fairer tax system. It
should be simpler for Canadians to understand and comply with the
self-assessment system and voluntary compliance. The Economic
Council, in its contribution, emphasized fairness, simplicity, and
stability (of legislation), among other goals 0 Most recently, in his
budget speech earlier this year, the Minister of Finance, the Hon.
Michael Wilson, reiterated the goals of tax reform as the creation of
a fairer and more effective tax system that will play a role in
stimulating investment, and encouraging dynamic business activity, job
creation, and economic growth.1 Simplicity was not named. One
likes to think it was subsumed in the word "effective," or perhaps
needed no further underscoring. A cynic might suggest that the
Minister had seen the first draft.
III. THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS
In Canada, as elsewhere, special regimes of capital gains
taxation (or exemption) have been a perennial enemy of
simplification. Viewing the world through pre-1972 glasses, the
Carter Commission clearly saw that the differential treatment of
capital gains and other forms in incremental wealth was a source of
undue complexity. "[I]t is the attempt to distinguish between capital
and income gains, in order to tax the one at a different rate than
12
the other, that creates the complexity and uncertainty."'
Distinctions, it appears, breed complications.

9

Guidelines for Tax Reform in Canada,supra, note 3.

10 Econonic Council of Canada, Road Map for Tax Reform: The Taxation of Savings and

Investment (Ottawa: Can. Govt. Pub. Centre, 1987) at 6.
l1Hon. M.H. Wilson, Minister of Finance, The Budget Speech (Ottawa: Dept of Finance,
1987) at 11.

12Report, vol. 1, supra, note 1 at 15.
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A similar message is conveyed in the recent report of the
Economic Council of Canada. A significant source of complexity in
the income tax system, it notes, is the definition of the tax base.
Since the base is not grounded in uniform and consistent principles,
taxpayers may arrange their affairs so that similar activities are taxed
differently. This leads to erosion of the base and consequent
legislation to close perceived loopholes. The result is further
complexity. It is significant that the Economic Council cited the
13
taxation of capital gains as a "classic example" of the problem.
Whatever the economic or legal rationalization for the
distinction between capital gains and ordinary income, the differential
taxation of the two has undoubtedly engendered complexity in
drafting, conceptual underpinnings, and administration.
More
precisely, it is the interaction between the intellectual severing of
fruit and tree on the one hand and the increasing sophistication and
complication of commercial and other economic transactions on the
other, that has led to complexity. If the income tax system imposed
a flat rate of tax on an undefined income base with no deductions
or credits, no special rules, and no tax on corporate or other
intermediaries, the special treatment of capital gains would still
render compliance more difficult, but only in the sense that taxpayers
and administrators would be forced to examine receipts and
characterize them as falling within or without the tax base. This
effect should not be underestimated, but it is only a small part of
the actual complexity that has arisen due to the differential
treatment of capital gains. The real problem can be traced directly
to the impact of the distinction between the two types of receipt in
a universe populated by incorporated companies, financial
intermediaries, partnerships, and trusts.
This differentiation has led to great complexity in the statute,
measured by the quantity of enactments specifically required to deal
with it, and the subtle and recondite concepts underlying such
legislation. Prior to 1972, a substantial portion of the anti-avoidance
provisions dealt, in one way or another, with the problem of
dividend stripping, the conversion of taxable dividend income into
tax-free capital gains. This problem obsessed the Carter Com-

13

Economic Council of Canada, supra, note 10 at 6.
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mission, and perhaps with good reason. Their solution, as noted
above, was not to revile stripping but to bury it. They would have
accomplished the task by full integration and full taxation of capital
gains.
The half taxation of capital gains introduced in 1972 seemed,
paradoxically, rather more complicated than total exemption.
Significant amendments were made, indeed, whole new systems
established, to accommodate a type of income that was neither fish
nor fowl. This was a great challenge in the area of corporate
distributions in view of the decision, fair enough in itself, to enable
the "tax-free half' of the gain to be realized indirectly through one
or more corporate intermediaries. To make matters worse, a
political judgment was made, again on equity grounds, that presystem capital gains should not be garnered into the tax base. This
required a valuation day and a host of new rules to preserve the
transitional relief through subsequent transactions, substitutions, and
reorganizations and, once again, through corporate and other
intermediaries. Transitional rules invariably lead to complexity. In
fact, transition costs should always be considered in assessing tax
amendments even if the overall result is to simplify the system. A
further policy decision required the creation of a "tax-free zone" to
prevent the taxation of phantom gains, increments of value after
1971 in respect of assets that had declined in value before that time.
The transitional rules and their progeny are still with us. Such rules
are very difficult to rescind, even much later when the number of
taxpayers affected by the relief dwindles.
The anti-avoidance structure dealing with the differential
treatment of capital gains, and especially surplus stripping, was also
recreated (or "reformed") in 1972. I will refer to it again in the
context of tax avoidance. It is interesting to note the creative
attempt that was made in the 1970s to simplify this structure by
reducing the preference for capital gains as against the particular
source of income with which the tension was the greatest: taxable
dividends. This was done, not by complex changes to the regime of
capital gains taxation, but through an increase in the dividend tax
credit. Significant structural simplification resulted. Paid-up capital
deficiency and debt limit rules were repealed, as was designated
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surplus. There were, however, complexity costs elsewhere in the
system associated with the change, notably in the small business
area.
The next important event was the enactment of the lifetime
capital gains exemption in 1985. Whatever the incentive or policy
(or political) justifications, there can be little question about its
structural effects. Prior attempts to bring capital gains taxation
closer to dividend taxation were undone at a stroke. Part of the
elaborate anti-avoidance structure that had been dismantled in the
1970s was re-enacted (new rules for computing paid-up capital,
revised surplus-stripping rules, and specific anti-avoidance rules).
Capital markets have already responded, and investors have not been
slow to seek out economic transactions that will enable them to
Iearn"

capital gains (preferably with borrowed money). Pressures in

the current tax reform to deal with matters such as passive
investment income (reminiscent of the restricted interest expense of
the 1981 budget) are undoubtedly increased by the capital gains
exemption.
Politically, it would be difficult for this government, or even
future governments, to eliminate the exemption and embrace the
Carter Commission's proposals respecting capital gains (although,
ironically, the 1986 U.S. tax reform did eliminate their special
treatment). Nor is it clear that there are not inherent difficulties in
the full taxation of such gains absent some kind of indexing. More
creative approaches to the taxation of capital wealth are probably
required. In the more immediate term it would not be surprising
to find a move in this and subsequent tax reforms towards a
reduction in the differential treatment of capital gains and other
forms of income. This could involve taxation of a higher percentage
of non-exempt capital gains, as well as restrictions on the exemption
or reductions in its value. In the longer term, there seems no doubt
that significant simplification of the income tax system requires a
different basis for taxing capital.
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IV. TAX AVOIDANCE AND SIMPLIFICATION
Several important tax policy goals are seriously undermined
by tax avoidance. It can adversely affect the quantum and the
stability of revenues. Since not all taxpayers have the same ability
to avoid taxation, any abuses tend to reduce horizontal and vertical
equity. Even if they do not, the perception that they do can damage
the voluntary compliance that permits self-assessment and efficient
collection. From the beginnings of income taxation, a good deal of
the amending and reform process has been directed against tax
avoidance. The correlation between complexity in the income tax
law and its administration and the effort to manage, if not eliminate,
tax avoidance or abuse is undoubtedly very high.
Dealing with abuse is an inherently complicated exercise.
However, much of the convoluted drafting, the Byzantine concepts,
and the unadministrable aspects of the tax system can be traced to
a confusion in defining abuse and in deciding how to deal with it.
Today's tax incentive becomes tomorrow's loophole (for example,
MURBs). The lines between what is permitted and what is not are
often unclear, not only because they are hard to draw, but because
no one has decided where to try to draw them.
The Carter Commission provided a useful definition of tax
avoidance: changing the form of an activity, organization or asset in
order to escape the tax that would otherwise apply. 14 The
Commission has also left us with an important paper on the
subject. 1S This appendix, written more than twenty years ago,
exhibits an almost eerie contemporaneity. The issues, the problems,
and the solutions seem to be unchanged, notwithstanding the major
tax reform of 1971; the numerous statutory shifts and dodges since;
and two decades of case law, including some recent decisions that
most of us thought important.
In that appendix, the two basic legislative approaches, specific
rules and general rules, are reviewed.
The advantages and
disadvantages of each are noted. One drawback to specific rules is

14Report, vol. 4, supra, note 1 at 21.
151biaL vol. 3 at 537ff.
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their complexity: they are "responsible for much of the obscurity of
the Act, couched as such legislation often is in tortuous
and obscure
16
language of unparalleled complexity and difficulty.,
In another appendix, dealing with the then current avoidance
problem of surplus-stripping (now making a comeback), 7 the same
preference for general avoidance rules is expressed, in different
terms. The historical perspective in this discussion is particularly
interesting. It reviews the pre-1949 and post-1948 legislation
culminating in the predecessor to subsection 247(1).
There is a striking similarity in the history of the legislation to prevent surplus

stripping in the two periods. In each case, attempts were made originally to enact
legislation that detailed the then known methods of surplus stripping and detailed
the tax consequences of using the particular method. In each case, the attempts
failed and the subsequent amendments to extend or strengthen the legislation
were
18
unsuccessful until, ultimately, resort was had to discretionary legislation.

The Carter proposals approached some tax avoidance
problems through neither general nor specific rules but, instead,
through changes to the tax system that circumvented the problem,
a kind of conceptual pre-emptive strike (for example, full integration
and full taxation of capital gains). Nonetheless, the message of the
Commission, and in particular these two appendices, may fairly be
said to be that specific anti-avoidance rules, while they undoubtedly
have their place, tend not to work. There are advantages and
disadvantages to each approach, but ultimately nothing fails like
failure.
In this respect, it is also interesting to compare the
Australian experience.19 High rates of personal tax and an extremely
narrow income tax base appeared to invite tax avoidance. The
narrowness of the base was due partly to statutory provisions,
particularly the lack of taxation of capital gains, and partly to a
16

Ibid vol. 3 at 556.

17

Ibid vol. 4 at 597ff., Appendix D.

18

1bid vol. 4 at 603-604.

19

This brief summary is based upon, but cannot do justice to, the excellent article by

Richard Krever, 'Tax Reform in Australia: Base Broadening Down Under" (1986) 34 Can.
Tax J.346.
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series of judicial decisions that seemed to condone dividend-stripping,
assignments of income, and other such schemes. Until the 1970s, a
compromise formula had been worked out by revenue authorities
and tax advisors to distinguish non-taxable sales of shares from
dividend-stripping schemes giving rise to ordinary income. Perhaps
because of increased sophistication or economic pressures, the
compromise broke down. The lengths to which tax advisors and
their clients went were indeed extreme. As in the Canadian context,
one of the key defences for the fisc was maintaining a link between
the taxation of the seller of shares and the subsequent activities of
the purchaser, particularly where the two deliberately organized the
transaction with a view to effecting a disappearance of surplus. In
an Australian case, however, the High Court found the sellers of
shares not liable to tax as a consequence of subsequent actions of
the purchasers, even if the whole scheme was deliberately organized
as the surplus-strip.
That case, Slutzki v. FCT,2 ° gave rise to the infamous
"bottom of the harbour" schemes. The original plans were known
as "dry Slutzkins." Taxed retained earnings of a corporation were
distributed without the second-level distribution tax by means of a
sale of shares, the familiar dividend-strip of the 1960s in Canada.
However, the more adventurous soon developed what were known
as "wet Slutzkins," involving the sale of shares of companies with as
yet undischarged current-year tax liabilities. In this case, not only
was there a tax-free capital gain to the seller, but the mainstream
corporate tax was not paid, either. On the theory of Slutzki, the
seller took the position that whether or not the purchaser ever
caused the tax to be paid was not his concern, even if the seller
could confidently predict the result. The corporate shell, bereft of
assets but still possessed of its tax liability, was all the revenue
officials could ever find. Company records, it was said, could be
found at the bottom of the harbour, whence the sobriquet "wet."
The result was a new assault on tax avoidance. Australia
already had section 260, which might have been regarded in the
abstract as a reasonably tough general anti-avoidance provision.
It did not seem to have had the desired result, because of an

20(1977), 7 A.T.R. 166.
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exception of "ordinary commercial or family dealing." The section
was also found deficient by the courts in not providing for an
alternative result. That is, the section enabled a court to disregard
a transaction, but did not seem to permit any recharacterization in
order to determine the tax liability. The new approach to antiavoidance included both specific and general provisions. The
government took aim at the tax avoidance schemes it knew about
that had escaped the application of section 260. It enacted a new
general anti-avoidance provision, a new and improved section 260,
without the "ordinary and commercial dealings" exception, and with
appropriate powers to reconstruct the tax result. There were also
amendments to the Australian equivalent of our InterpretationAct,
requiring a court in interpreting a provision of a statute to choose
the construction that would promote the purpose or object
underlying the statute. This is similar to a rule already contained in
our InterpretationAct, 21 and could also be viewed as a legislative
statement of the rule espoused by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the Stubart decision. 22 A further amendment to the Australian
legislation governing interpretation of statutes expressly permitted
the use of extrinsic materials, such as parliamentary debates and
explanatory memoranda.
Canada has not had its "wet Slutzkins" on the scale of
Australia's. There have been analogous cases, in which aggressive
tax planning leaves, as its residue, a corporation without assets that
may or may not have a tax liability (depending on whether the
scheme works). We certainly have our own "made in Canada" tax
avoidance problems. The scientific research tax credit, while it
undoubtedly financed a good deal of real live scientific research, also
created a new corps of tax avoidance promoters. Many of the same
people who brought us unintelligible and improbable SRTCS have also
created (or sold) Brazilian research partnerships and other well-nigh
indefensible (from a policy, if not a legal perspective) tax avoidance
plans. Less extreme, but probably more troublesome from the fiscal
point of view, have been loss trading schemes involving accrued and

21

hterpretationAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-13, s. 11.

22

Stubart Investments Ltd v. The Queen, [1984] C.T.C. 294 (S.C.C.).
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unrealized ("pregnant") capital or trading losses, purchase of
corporate shells with recoverable corporation tax, washing of accrued
profits though loss companies, sale of accumulated scientific research
expenditures, and other devices, most of which seem to have been
dealt a blow in the Department of Finance 15 January 1987 press
release. The tax entrepreneurs devoted to wringing money out of
the tax base, together with the infamous "overhang" of unused
deductions and credits, will undoubtedly continue to exert a market
pressure of tax revenues.
The development of the legislative approach to tax avoidance
is intimately linked to the problem of complexity and ensuing
difficulties in compliance. I recall a comment made in Plato's
Republic. Discussing business transactions, legal proceedings, and
regulations for markets, Socrates asks his interlocutor whether we
can realistically legislate these matters. The answer is negative. In
the new republic, there will be no need to dictate to men of good
breeding. They will themselves determine what rules are needed;
indeed there is no other choice. "Otherwise, they will spend their
lives making a host of petty regulations and amending them in the
hope of reaching perfection."23 The problem is obviously not new.
Since 1971, the income tax system has been amended and reamended with great attention to detail, and with significant
incremental complexity, in the continuing battle against tax
avoidance. A large part of the process has been aimed at protecting
the tax on corporate contributions. This would include the subtleties
of the new designated-surplus system created in 1971, fine-tuned on
many occasions, and finally repealed in 1977. One could add the
paid-up capital deficiency, debt limit, and other arcana of the mid1970s, and their recent counterparts in the paid-up capital
amendments following upon the capital gains exemption. Also
related to the taxation of corporate distributions and capital gains
are the "capital gains strip" rules of section 55 and the underlying
code of administrative practice that has created, by fiat, a mirror
image of designated surplus.
A second thread running through the amendments dealing
with tax avoidance over the last fifteen years is the attempt to
23

plato's Republic, F.M. Cornford ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1945) at 116.
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confine losses, credits, and deductions to the taxpayer who has
suffered or been allowed them. This can be seen in the capital cost
allowance restrictions successively applied to real estate (1972);
leasing properties (1976); and hotels, yachts, and similar assets
(1985). The 27 November 1986 press release dealing with changes
to the tax treatment of intercorporate dividends described the most
recent in a series of provisions commonly lumped together as the
"term-preferred share rules" as "simply one more step in preventing
the inappropriate transfer of unusable tax deductions to outside
investors." This series of amendments dates back to the original
term-preferred share rules of 1978, which have been amended and
expanded in virtually every budget since. The 15 January 1987
release was, of course, expressly directed to the transfer of unused
losses and deductions. This latter problem seems to loom large,
particularly in the corporate tax reform of today. The "overhang"
has been referred to in recent budgets. It is very large, and seems
to inflate to fill the schemes concocted to use it.
The cycle of action and reaction, as predicted by Plato, has
not eliminated tax avoidance, although it has created complexity.
This is the worst kind of feedback: the complexity itself breeds
more tax avoidance.
History suggests that general or even
discretionary tax avoidance legislation will close the cycle, at least for
a time. Specific anti-avoidance legislation will always be with us,
regardless of the potential enrichment of general rules. Yet the
general provisions will likely become more prominent precisely
because the specific rules multiply. It is often said that one difficulty
with detailed anti-avoidance provisions is that they provide taxpayers
with a "road map". By delineating precisely what is prohibited, the
legislator suggests by indirection what is permitted. We are left with
a modified Raskolnikov theory of taxation: everything is permitted
that is not expressly prohibited.
In his 1987 budget speech, the Minister of Finance
announced that "to ensure a fairer and more stable income tax
system" there will be improved general anti-avoidance rules. Such
rules can facilitate compliance, and thereby increase the level of
simplicity in the income tax system. However, that need not be the
case.

Obviously, the rules must be well thought out and framed in
a manner that takes into account the judicial approach to tax
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avoidance. One foreseeable danger is that general anti-avoidance
rules will be too specific. The strength of a general rule, which can
also be its weakness, is the plasticity or ambiguity of language, which
enables the rule to be applied through the exercise of judgment in
unforeseeable situations. This is why such rules necessarily create
some uncertainty, yet it is also why they can be made to work. A
technical drafting style, carving out permitted exemptions or etching
the outlines of proscribed behaviour, can undermine the general
thrust of the rule.
To reduce the uncertainty and to make the rule effective,
there must be a concerted and consistent exercise of judgment
regarding its application: by the Department of National Revenue
in its administrative posture; by the Department of Justice in its
recommendations respecting litigation, and in the positions taken by
it in conducting litigation; and, ultimately, by the courts.
V. NEUTRALITY AND HORIZONTAL EQUITY
Neutrality in the tax system is increased when the
interference of taxation with economic decisions taken in otherwise
efficient markets is reduced. Generally, this goal is related to the
use of income taxation to deliver incentives or discriminate between
economic industries, activities, or transactions. Horizontal equity, as
the Carter Commission put it, requires that "individuals and families
in the same circumstances bear the same taxes." 24 Horizontal equity
should, perhaps, be considered a facet of neutrality; a tax system
that does not interfere with economic decisions should treat
economic equals equally.
The current system is far from neutral. Opposition parties
and the press are quick to highlight inequities (although often of the
vertical, rather than the horizontal, orientation) between individuals
and industries. Somehow, taxpayers standing in the ruts on the
playing field tend to recognize the lack of neutrality more readily
than those on the mounds. While in some areas the statutory rules
that offend the principle are quite obvious, there is no simple test

24Report, vol. 1, supra, note 1 at 4.
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for determining horizontal equity or neutrality generally. An elegant
method was practiced in ancient Greece. Where a man upon whom
a levy was imposed considered another to be richer, and therefore
more justly chargeable, he might challenge the other either to
assume the burden of that taxation or to make an antidosis, a
compulsory exchange of all their property. It is interesting to
speculate on the results were such a procedure applied in
contemporary society.
Equity in general, and horizontal equity in particular, is
commonly cited as a goal that is inherently inimical to simplification.
Given my comments above regarding the effect of anti-avoidance
rules on complexity, this view is perhaps understandable. However,
it is misconceived. Indeed, complexity itself is inequitable. As the
current Minister of Finance has said: "The more complicated the
tax system, the more difficult it is to understand - and the fewer the
taxpayers who can make the best possible use of its provisions. This
is not fair to the average taxpayer. A simpler, more understandable
tax system will lead to greater fairness.I' 2s The same, I believe,
applies to neutrality. Complexity makes it more likely that two
similarly-situated persons or economically equivalent transactions will
be afforded different tax treatment.
The lack of neutrality may derive from interpretation and
administration. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada
recently took aim at a particular example of "formalism" often urged
by taxpayers, and surprisingly conceded in argument by counsel for
the Crown, that would place wealthy individuals in a better position
to deduct interest on borrowed money merely by ordering their
be directly traced to an "eligible"
affairs so that the borrowing can
26
use.
"ineligible"
rather than an
However, more often inequity is the conscious and
intentional result of legislation. Various tax incentives, exemptions,
and credits are openly designed to favour one type of industry,
activity, or transaction over another. These provisions inevitably
make compliance more difficult, and the income tax system thereby
25Hon. M.H. Wilson, Minister of Finance, Address (Canadian Tax Foundation, 24
November 1986) at 7 [unpublished].
26
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more complex. It is not surprising that tax reforms, at least of
recent vintage, generally take aim at such incentives.
The only way to promote one activity over another through
the tax system is to remit tax to the likely participants. Basebroadening involves the reduction or elimination of such preferences,
thereby promoting neutrality and horizontal equity. In many cases,
this involves simplification as well. Base-broadening may further
complicate the system, if it is half-hearted, contrived, or equivocal.
There is also, admittedly, an inherent complication arises from the
difference between the tax base and either accounting income or
ordinary conceptions of income. To this extent, achieving neutrality
does tend to exacerbate complexity. To the extent that the broader
base may be eroded by taxpayers' ingenuity, anti-avoidance rules are
required, and these, too, generate more complexity. Overall,
however, tax reform can simplify compliance while enhancing
neutrality and equity - which is not to say that it will.
V. EPILOGUE
Since these remarks were prepared, the terms of the 1987 tax
reform have been announced. It was not hard to be prescient about
their impact on simplifation. A few observations are nonetheless
appropriate by way of postscript, or perhaps post mortem.
Lip service continues to be paid to simplicity (fewer brackets,
fewer preferences) but the stunning legilsative package speaks
louder. Base-broadening turns out to be not quite so simple, and
transitions even more complex than one might have expected. In
addition to the traditional sources of complexity, tax reform provides
many new ones, in surprising places. A perfect example is
something as mundane as automobile expenses. Compliance will
surely be more costly, and less complete. The commission salesman
with a leased vehicle is limited to a deduction determined by the
formula
A/B * (C + (D/E * F))
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but not exceeding the lesser of
(A * B)/30 - C - D- E
and
(A*B/.85C) - D - E

(where each variable is differently defined in each formula).
The specific areas treated in the remarks above are also
illustrative. Capital gains are more taxed, but not fully taxed, leaving
the usual tensions in place. The cpaital gains exemption is, as
predicted by most, reduced, but it is still there. Indeed, it is more
complex than ever due to political constraints in connection with
small business and farming. To make matters worse, a kind of
passive loss system is included, but only for purposes of determining
the capital gains exemption. All this, and minimum tax as well.
The assault on tax avoidance continues on all fronts. There
are new specific anti-avoidance measures along with the muchheralded general anti-avoidance rule. Among the former, one should
probably include the quite astoninishing revision of the preferred
share provisions, which retain all the former classifications, add some
new ones and provide a bewildering increase in overall complexity.
The general anti-avoidance rule does seem to be general (so much
so that at least one commentator has argued that it oversteps the
rule of law). The curious and somewhat inaccurate attempt to
incorporate by reference the civilian notion of abus de droit in
subsection 245(4) is sure to provide a source of continuing
consternation and administrative dithering (and hence complexity).
It is perhaps ironic that the French text of this very subsection
should be so different from the English, suggesting that the drafters
themselves may not have been in full agreement regarding its
meaning.
There will almost certainly be renewed cries for
simplification, and perhaps even some renewed efforts to simplify in
limited areas (attribution rules?). It is likely that the complex
reform will take root and sprout yet additional complexity as it is
amended and reformed to meet the inevitable difficulties it will

create.

